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Abstract 
With the rise of China and the United States (US) foreign policy rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific meeting in international space, small states like New Zealand have decisions to make 
about how to manage their balancing act between the two major powers. This research is the 
result of an extensive literature review of the available material coming from international 
relations scholars, diplomats, governments, and news media. The focus of this thesis is on 
the options a small state like New Zealand has amid China’s rise and the US foreign policy 
‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific since late-2011, but some attention has been given to how the US 
rebalance has been rolled out and New Zealand’s position therein. The findings point to a 
spectrum of options available to New Zealand which goes between choosing a China-centric 
economic focused set of foreign policies on one end, and backing US interests both in 
economic and security terms on the other end. It is clear New Zealand has chosen a middle 
ground and has adopted a hedging strategy designed to optimize its relationship with both 
the US and China. The task ahead for New Zealand is to use what influence it has to foster 
an environment where the likelihood of conflict between the two major powers is reduced 
without giving up too much independence in foreign policy decision making. 
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Introduction 
Major power relationships in international politics define the space in which states act. Since 
the end of World War II the United States (US) has been an established major power on the 
international stage, and the relationships it has had with countries and regions over the past 
six decades have shaped world politics, often to the benefit of the US and its allies.1 The 
system of international free trade and integrated world markets developed and maintained by 
the US and its Western allies has spurred on economic growth the world over. Those who 
have elected to play by the rules of the Western system have done well and benefited from 
US protection and wealth. But while this liberal democratic value structure has been the 
foundation on which the growth and development of the latter half of the 20th century has 
been built, it has not been a universally inclusive model. Those who have been ideologically 
opposed to the Western system have struggled or collapsed. At present, China is proving to 
be an anomaly and is forging a new path for growing states. 
The US response to China’s growth has been to directly engage the growing Asian country. 
For the US this engagement has been from a position of strength, but for smaller states the 
avenue to influence is not by building capacity in defence and power projection, but by 
working to establish concepts and norms that mesh with that state’s interests and the 
presiding international system. While New Zealand has meagre power projection 
capabilities it is none the less a member of Hedley Bull’s ‘anarchic society’ of states in the 
international system, and therefore a participant in the process.2 New Zealand can do little to 
bully China or the US, but  small to medium sized states can seek to influence change 
through institutional support and participation. Herein lays the potential for small states like 
New Zealand to influence international society. For New Zealand it is a matter of staying on 
the radar of its more powerful partners.3 Keeping close enough not only to its nearest 
neighbour Australia, but also to China and the US, is a challenging foreign policy balancing 
act that will require deft manoeuvring by New Zealand diplomats and politicians.  
                                                 
1 Hegemonic stability theory is one theory that has been used to describe why the international system we have 
today exists, and why the US is arguably responsible for what the complexion of that system has been since the 
end of World War II. George Modelski’s long cycle theory and Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory 
also take aim at describing how powerful states rise and fall and establish order in the international system. See 
Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 10. ed. (international) (Boston: 
Pearson/Longman, 2012), 59. 
2 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed.,forewords by Stanley 
Hoffmann and Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
3 Robert Ayson, “New Zealand in Australia’s Asian Century,” blog, The Diplomat, December 1, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2012/12/01/new-zealand-in-australias-asian-century/. 
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Since the late 1970s China’s status in global politics and as an economic player has steadily, 
and in relative terms rapidly been on the rise both in spite of and inherently because of the 
international system perpetuated by the US and the West. China has developed, in spite of 
the Western system, as an ostensibly communist state diametrically opposed to the market-
based liberal capitalist model. One-party rule, decision by consensus, and running the state 
based on what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) thinks is best for the collective is the 
structure under which China made massive improvements in infrastructure, economic 
growth, and “systematically” moved some of the poorest classes into urban centres,4 the 
greatest such migration in modern history.  Conversely China has grown precisely because 
of the advantages an open market system provides for a country like China which is resource 
rich and geo-strategically advantaged.5 The Deng Xiaoping led opening of China allowed 
the country to prosper from trading relationships with the West, secure financial systems, 
and international law, all of which helped China emerge from the Cultural Revolution as a 
would-be regional leader and global power. 
China’s growth in economic, defence, and political influence represents the most credible 
challenge to US dominance in global politics. Some theories of power transition in 
international politics predict that conflict is likely if not inevitable with the US as the 
established power and China as a rising, and maybe challenging power .6 Others see the 
relationship in more nuanced hues as a balance between forces that push the US and China 
toward conflict and those that encourage cooperation.7 Having moved beyond the status of 
an emerging power,8 China must be recognized by all stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific as a 
state that must be dealt with on its own terms as well as through the mechanisms of the 
existing international community of institutions and accepted norms. Whether the US and 
China enter into outright conflict or their relationship waxes and wanes between one of 
                                                 
4 See Lei Guang, “The State Connection in China’s Rural-Urban Migration,” International Migration Review 
39, no. 2 (July 1, 2005): 354–380, doi:10.2307/27645501. 
5 Bryce Harland, “America Must Learn to Respect Asia’s Way of Doing Things,” International Herald 
Tribune, May 3, 1996, sec. OPINION. 
6 See Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, 57. 
7 Friedberg talks about how “(t)he collision between these opposing sets of forces will produce a U.S.- 
China relationship that continues to be characterized by constrained, or bounded, competition.” Aaron L. 
Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” International Security 30, no. 2 
(October 1, 2005): 44, doi:10.2307/4137594. 
8 Ian Clark, “China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?,” International Affairs (London) 87, 
no. 1 (2011): 19, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00957.x. 
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attraction and repulsion is of importance not only to the two big players in the Asia-Pacific 
but also to more modestly sized players in the region. 
Were cooler minds not to prevail and China and the US find themselves in an outright 
security clash, New Zealand could elect to stand on the side-lines.9 Australia’s security links 
and obligations to the US are secure and pre-determined by virtue of a defence alliance and 
continued expressions of devotion to said relationship. Would Sino-American conflict put a 
strain on the relationship New Zealand has with Australia, its closest friend and ally? New 
Zealand might be forced to jeopardize its profitable relationship with China in favour of the 
protection offered both politically and geographically by Australia. Malcolm Cook sees this 
trans-Tasman relationship New Zealand has with Australia as a shield from Asian influence, 
both in real and perceived terms.10 New Zealand is unlikely to relinquish the benefits of the 
political and security effects of the Australian ‘shield’ because under this protection New 
Zealand has had the luxury to view China predominantly as an economic partner and not a 
security concern.11 
China plays an increasingly interconnected role in Asia-Pacific economics and politics. 
Small states have options beyond bandwagoning with their larger friends, a process by 
which the small state must give up some independence. At stake for New Zealand is its 
traditional and close partnership with Australia, a burgeoning defence relationship with the 
US, and the strong pull of its economic connections to China. The danger with these 
competing attractions is that New Zealand could lose sight of what is most important to New 
Zealanders. Choosing a side could reflect a lack of attention to the mutli-faceted picture 
ignoring issues important to New Zealanders such as human rights violations or Chinese 
military growth in the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, in light of Australia’s security alignment 
with US interests, it is of particular interest to understand what it means if New Zealand is 
re-hitching their wagon to a US Western-style leadership model,12 or are instead realigning 
                                                 
9 Robert Ayson, “Rise of Chinese dragon could divide Australia and NZ,” New Zealand Herald, April 20, 
2011, sec. Business, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10720410. 
10 Malcolm Cook and Asia New Zealand Foundation, Standing Together, in Single File Australian Views of 
New Zealand and Asia, Outlook ed. 13, track II (Wellington, N.Z: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2010). 
11 Ayson, “Rise of Chinese dragon could divide Australia and NZ,” April 20, 2011. 
12 Amy L Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itself Out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’ in 
Asymmetric Alliances1,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (2010): 317–338, doi:10.1111/j.1743-
8594.2010.00115.x. 
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with an Asian leadership model.13 New Zealand finds itself looking up, in a geographic and 
real power hierarchy sense, at a spectrum of options. On one end New Zealand sees its 
prosperous economic relationship with China. On the other New Zealand has a re-
invigorated relationship with the US which is moving slowly  in the direction of greater 
defence cooperation. Between those two poles is an opportunity for New Zealand to hedge 
its foreign policy, work with both tentative partners, and maintain its independent sense of 
identity. The middle option, however, requires greater skill to manage and a higher level of 
commitment to the process, and therefore willingness to fund the diplomatic requirements of 
maintaining beneficial and amicable relations with both major powers. 
This thesis seeks to discover how New Zealand, as a small state, can avoid alienating vital 
partners while advancing its interests within the feasible options. In light of the Asia-Pacific 
power balance, New Zealanders should be concerned not only with their countrys position 
and relationships but also with the positioning and relationships of others. Ideas and 
perceptions are as important as actual capabilities in international relations (IR). The ideas 
major powers espouse matter as they guide foreign policy and shape international life.14 
With China’s meteoric rise colliding with the US foreign policy rebalance to the region, 
New Zealand must ask itself if a power transition is underway, and if so how said transition 
will affect its interests. The course New Zealand charts for itself will determine the range of 
options available to respond to shifts in power in the Asia-Pacific. What follows is a 
discussion of the context in which New Zealand must navigate a potential power shift, the 
options available, and New Zealand’s position between China’s rise and the American 
foreign policy rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. 
China’s rise and the American rebalance 
In late 2011 United States President Barack Obama signalled to the world that the US would 
begin a process of shifting its focus to direct more economic, defence, and diplomatic 
resources to the Asia-Pacific region. The ‘pivot’, as it was initially coined, is a strategy the 
US adopted to turn its attention to the Asia-Pacific in an effort to further its interests in the 
region. The pivot westward was a turn away from America’s long and conflicted 
                                                 
13 Robert Ayson, “Australia’s Defense Policy: Medium Power, Even Bigger Ambitions?,” The Korean Journal 
of Defense Analysis 22, no. 2 (2010): 189, doi:10.1080/10163271003744447. 
14 Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies And International Order (Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 1. 
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engagements in the Middle East and Central Asia, and their more secure yet important 
interests in Europe, something that encouraged fears of abandonment in partner and allied 
nations in those European regions.15 The pivot strategy announcement indicated the US had 
finally recognized that the global economy and future of a significant portion of their 
security interests were now centred in the Asia-Pacific. At first glance the pivot, a title later 
rebranded under the more politically correct term ‘rebalance’,16 looked to many like a direct 
response to an increasingly confident and proactive China. While early on it was unclear 
exactly what the US’ intentions were, it did seem that China was at the core of their 
motivation.  
The US foreign policy rebalance may to some seem reactionary and novel, but it is neither. 
Since the end of World War II the US, and indeed the West, has been an integral player in 
the Asia-Pacific in terms of providing security and the mechanisms for economic growth 
and development. In that time “the United States has systematically favored active 
engagement in world affairs, a commitment to a liberal and open international order, and the 
development of multilateral practices and institutions.”17 The political climate which 
precipitated the situation by which the US could conceivably rebalance, or ‘return’, to the 
Asia-Pacific began about 40 years ago when US legitimacy world-wide began to diminish. 
Confidence in US supremacy began to wane after the OPEC oil crisis of the mid-70s and the 
Iranian revolution of 1979.18 American’s unquestioned dominance took a further 
delegitimizing blow with the culmination of the Vietnam War, which effectively ended the 
era of Pax Americana.19 Whereas the US was once the sole presiding power in the Asia-
Pacific, setting the agenda in economic and defence circles, the subsequent environment 
began to be one informed by competing interests, influential institutions, and unprecedented 
environmental and security pressures, e.g. sea level rise, securing fisheries, terrorism, and 
drug and human trafficking. 
                                                 
15 Raoul Heinrichs, “Pivotal Dilemmas,” The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog, The Strategist, 
February 5, 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/pivotal-dilemmas/. 
16 Richard Weitz, “Pivot Out, Rebalance In,” The Diplomat, March 5, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/03/pivot-out-rebalance-in/. 
17 Legro, Rethinking the World, 3. 
18 George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder; London: L. Rienner Publishers ; Frances Pinter, 
1987), 223. 
19 Shumpei Kumon, ed., “The Theory of Long Cycles Examined,” in Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder; 
London: L. Rienner Publishers ; Frances Pinter, 1987), 56. 
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The two decades following the death of Mao Zedong Saw China re-open its doors to the 
international community, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the subsequent dismantling of the 
Soviet Union, all of which heralded a paradigm shift in IR, and more broadly in the global 
political economy. No longer were there two dominant powers balancing against one 
another. The threat to the psyche of the West from communism was greatly diminished, and 
it was evident the Western model of liberal democracy and capitalist markets were the order 
of the day. 
China may be a primary driver for the American shift, but there are those who lie to varying 
degrees on the periphery of the rebalance who are an integral part of the dynamic of Sino-
American relations. New Zealand is one of those peripheral countries faced with the 
prospect of balancing the influence and interests of the American and Chinese giants.20 New 
Zealand currently sits in a tenuous position between two regimes, each with sometimes 
divergent interests in the Asia-Pacific. These divergent interests come to light surrounding 
issues like an unpredictable authoritarian North Korean regime, territorial disputes over East 
China Sea islands like the Diaoyu/Senkakus, and access to Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) and shipping routes in the South China Sea. The rebalance has also brought 
renewed interest in old US relationships in the region such as US links with  the Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and India, economic and trade talks, 
more support for counter trafficking and counter terrorism efforts, and human rights and 
environmental security concerns. These issues are not mutually exclusive or under the sole 
purview of the countries directly affected by them. Not only does New Zealand share in 
some of these concerns and relationships, but it is also involved in the discussion and 
solution process either through direct aid, offering security forces, or through its 
membership and participation in regional institutions. 
The US ‘pivot’ has also brought attention to issues more directly related to New Zealand, 
specifically in the Pacific surrounding human security issues in Fiji, Timor Leste, Solomon 
Islands, and Indonesia. But questions persist as to whether the added attention will be 
sustained. Over twenty years ago Bryce Harland, former New Zealand representative at the 
                                                 
20 The ‘giant’ metaphor takes a lyrical turn in Weatherbee’s analysis when he likens China and the US to two 
giant Gullivers, the former tied down by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the latter 
poked and prodded by the same actors of the greater ASEAN community. Donald E. Weatherbee, “Southeast 
Asia’s Security and Political Outlook,” in Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2011-2012 (Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2011), 3–9. 
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UN, Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, and High Commissioner to the United 
Kingdom, astutely observed that the Japanese, as many Asian countries, “will probably want 
the Americans to stay in the Pacific. The question is whether the Americans will be able, 
and willing, to do so.”21 The ensuing two decades have done little to change the fact that 
“the US is the only country that has the means of exerting power anywhere in the world,”22 
or to quiet concerns about American staying power in New Zealand’s part of the world. 
The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific shows their commitment, at least rhetorically, to the 
region. Their proposed shift of resources from Europe to the Pacific illustrates their belief in 
both the relative security and stability of Europe and their interests therein, and the value of 
having a greater presence in the Pacific for the foreseeable future. While New Zealand and 
the US share concern over human rights abuses and environmental change, it is not New 
Zealand interests which drive the rebalance, but American; and to the extent those two paths 
run parallel New Zealand benefits. For American’s, the rebalance has been more about 
countering China’s rising influence in the region than, for example, re-engaging old 
relationships or tackling issues of human rights abuses in Melanesia. If and when New 
Zealand and the US’ interests diverge New Zealand will be faced with having to decide 
whether to change course to match the divergence or to revaluate its top priority interests. 
While a relative peace persists in the Asia-Pacific one of those top priority interests for New 
Zealand has been its relationship with China. In economic terms China will almost certainly 
surpass the US by the end of this decade. Important financial markers like the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) measurement give us insight into relative gross domestic product (GDP) 
for China and the US.23 Using PPP/GDP the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the 
two major economies of the world will reach parity not by the end of this decade, but by the 
middle.24 The question all states face now is not if or even when China will become a global 
leader, but how. “With the double advantage of abundant land resources and convenient 
                                                 
21 Bryce Harland, On Our Own: New Zealand in the Emerging Tripolar World (Wellington [N.Z.]: Institute of 
Policy Studies, 1992), 77. 
22 Ibid. 
23 PPP is the rate at which the currency of one country would have to be converted into that of another country 
to buy the same amount of goods and services in each country. Tim Callen, “Finance and Development,” 
Finance and Development | F&D, March 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/03/basics.htm. 
24 Brett Arends, “IMF Bombshell: Age of America Nears End,” Market Watch, April 25, 2011, 
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-04-25/commentary/30714377_1_imf-chinese-economy-international-
monetary-fund. 
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maritime transportation, China will rise inevitably,”25 and to a great extent has already risen. 
New Zealand now faces the prospect of there being two major powers in the region: 
China has been very deferential to U.S. leadership over the past four decades. It’s been good 
for China, and it’s enabled it to integrate completely into the world order that the United 
States created and led. It’s simply unimaginable that when China is larger than the United 
States economically, it will continue to defer to American leadership.
26 
Despite the looming prospect of China reaching a critical mass at which point it must 
confront the US, Minxin Pei, a Chinese scholar, appropriately points out that China’s story 
has not yet been completely written: 
Yet, despite such undeniable achievements, it may be too soon to regard China as the 
world’s next superpower. Without doubt, China has already become a great power, a status 
given to countries that not only effectively defend their sovereignty, but also wield significant 
influence worldwide on economic and security issues. But a great power is not necessarily a 
superpower. In world history, only one country–the United States–has truly acquired all the 
capabilities of a superpower: a technologically advanced economy, a hi-tech military, a fully 
integrated nation, insuperable military and economic advantages vis-à-vis potential 
competitors, capacity to provide global public goods and an appealing ideology. Even in its 
heydays, the former Soviet Union was, at best, a one-dimensional superpower–capable of 
competing against the United States militarily, but lacking all the other crucial instruments 
of national power.
27
 
China has proven its ability to evolve and adapt. It has undergone historic growth and rapid 
integration into the international community of states. But until the questions surrounding 
the legitimacy of the CCP and their ability to lead internationally are addressed, super power 
status will remain elusive. But China does not need to be the US’ equal in every respect in 
order for New Zealand to want to continue its balancing act. The question for New Zealand 
is how much to hedge on whether the CCP can manage their challenges without 
                                                 
25 Cui Jian-Shu, “Cyclical Logic in the Transition of Hegemony: Modelski’s Long Cycle Theory in 
International Relations and Its Weakness,” Journal of World Economics and Politics No. 12 (2007): sec. VI. 
26 Robin Lustig, “What Should the Next American President Do About China?” (debate presented at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, October 4, 2012), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/04/what-should-next-american-president-do-about-china/dunc. 
27 Minxin Pei, “China’s Not a Superpower,” The Diplomat, 2010, 
http://apac2020.thediplomat.com/feature/china%E2%80%99s-not-a-superpower/. 
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disintegrating under the pressure of domestic and market demands for growth and an ever 
present and interested US. 
Though likely to soon be second in economic terms to China, the US will remain the 
supreme military power in the world for at least several decades to come. More importantly 
than whose PPP/GDP is the largest is that the US still plays a major role in setting the 
foreign policy agenda of the world’s governments, because “when it comes to China’s 
foreign policy, it’s all about the United States.”28 Nevertheless, both powers should be able 
to exist and prosper while occupying separate if not equal parts of the region, which is key 
for small states like New Zealand. Like other small states in the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand 
is being courted by both China and the US. The dilemma New Zealand faces is that it cannot 
maximize both relationships. The best New Zealand can hope for is to optimize each 
relationship by adopting a measured approach to both major powers. 
[N]o country wants to see a tension-filled U.S.-China relationship that creates pressure for everyone 
else to choose sides. They rather want to be able to maintain equally effective relations with China 
and the United States and to derive benefit from both the cooperation and the competition between 
the two giants in the region.
29 
China and the US are in a “battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who 
eventually prevails.”30 What it means to prevail in this context is less about winning a battle 
of militaries, something China cannot yet hope to achieve, and more about maintaining high 
levels of growth and the status quo. 
Both China and the US have stumbled on the path to advancing their cause of winning 
hearts and minds. Just as rhetoric and ideas matter in IR, so too do authority and legitimacy, 
and it will require innovative strategies for China to successfully deal with the questions of 
environmental degradation, gender issues, and humanitarian issues it faces. Beyond its 
borders China must “display humane authority in order to compete with the United States.” 
Though the US derives much of its authority from its military strength which “underpins 
                                                 
28 Michael Auslin, “For China, It’s All About America,” The Diplomat, July 6, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/china-power/for-china-its-all-about-america/. 
29 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia. 
30 Yan Xuetong, “How China Can Defeat America,” The New York Times, November 20, 2011, sec. Opinion, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html. 
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hegemony and helps to explain why the United States has so many allies,”31 ancient Chinese 
philosophers predict “the country that displays more humane authority will win.”32 
China is not the only country to have struggled with consistently displaying ‘humane 
authority’. The American War on Terror put US foreign policy under scrutiny and opened 
up avenues for criticism and scepticism regarding the US use of unilateral force. But unlike 
the US, which maintains robust alliance structures and informal partnerships in Asia since 
the 1950s, “China has not formed deep ties with any Asian state. There is no analogue in 
Chinese foreign policy to America’s relationship with Japan or its initiatives with 
Singapore.”33 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi described the situation between China and the US as 
one where “our two nations are trying to do something that has never been done in history, 
which is to write a new answer to the question of what happens when an established power 
and a rising power meet.”34 Minister Yang’s prescription for a ‘new’ answer is important to 
note. History tells us that when an established power meets a rising power there is conflict.35 
Can a small state contribute to the creation of a new answer that avoids conflict? New 
Zealand’s future will be inextricably tied to how China and the US relate to one another. 
Hugh White, prominent Australian defence author and former Australian Deputy Secretary 
for Strategy and Intelligence, opens his book about what he called the ‘China Choice’ by 
saying that “Australia’s future depends on America and China…and they are by far the two 
most important countries in the world to us.”36 Were a New Zealander writing a book on the 
‘China Choice’ the author would only have to amend that statement by adding Australia to 
the list. Outside New Zealand’s relationship with Australia, the American rebalance and 
China’s rise form the context in which New Zealand faces its most pressing foreign policy 
questions. While New Zealand has been engaging China on its meteoric rise since the early 
1970s, more recently it has encountered the American ‘pivot’. When China’s rise and the 
‘pivot’ intersect, New Zealand will have to decide how to engage both sides. 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Auslin, “For China, It’s All About America.” 
34 “Remarks With Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi” (Remarks, Beijing, September 5, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/197343.htm. 
35 Yang notes that war between the US and China is not inevitable. Hugh White, The China Choice: Why 
America should share power (Collingwood, Vic.: Black Inc., 2012), 129. 
36 Ibid., 1. 
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No state, small or large, will be able to reasonably consider not doing business with China 
on some level. And as long as nation-states continue to rely on the influence of the presence 
of security forces keeping the peace and upholding international laws to maintain those 
prosperous economies, the US will remain the global leader well into this century. In that 
light it should be noted that the relative balance of military power in the Asia-Pacific is 
changing as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone extensive modernization 
efforts.37 So while there is little doubt the US will remain the leader in providing military 
security in the Asia-Pacific,38 it may be a slightly more restricted leader in the future. 
The ‘pivot’ 
The American foreign policy rebalance to the Pacific, and ostensibly to the broader Asia-
Pacific region, prompted questions about American intent vis-à-vis China in the 
international community. The rebalance inspired in some Chinese commentators fears of an 
American led containment policy.39 A broader historical perspective reveals that the 
rebalance is nothing new as the US, though distracted by wars in the Middle East and 
President George W. Bush’s War on Terrorism, has long been engaged in the Asia-Pacific 
since the end of World War II, and certainly since the end of the Cold War. That is not to 
say the rebalance announcement has had no impact in the region. Rhetoric matters in IR and 
labelling the ‘pivot’ had the effect of codifying for many a perception that the centre of 
gravity for the world, certainly in terms of economics if not security and strategic thinking, 
had shifted to the Asia Pacific.40 
                                                 
37 Bitzinger said that “while Chinese military power may still pale in comparison to the US armed forces, the 
strength of the PLA relative to its likely local competitors in the Asia-Pacific region has increased 
significantly, and will likely continue to grow over the next ten to 20 years. As a result, China is definitely 
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The US foreign policy adjustment was followed up by a series of high profile events in the 
region, including the US hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ 
meeting in Hawaii, Obama giving a speech to the Parliament of Australia, and the US 
joining the East Asia Summit (EAS). Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
orchestrated the State Department push by dove-tailing with the initial efforts out of the 
White House and defining her “forward-deployed” diplomacy strategy in her Foreign Policy 
article ‘America’s Pacific Century’.41 Clinton’s vision involved a process where the US 
would dispatch their full range of diplomatic assets, from highest-ranking officials, 
development experts, interagency teams, and permanent assets, to every corner of the Asia-
Pacific region.42 
Backed by Clinton and US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Obama’s administration 
tackled questions that insinuated this strategy was designed to hem in and limit China’s 
pursuit of their interests in the Asia-Pacific. Despite repeated statements from the Obama 
administration that the rebalance is not a China-centric strategy,43 reference to China’s 
growing power in the region is peppered throughout the official rhetoric.44 The burning 
question Chinese scholars and policy makers have is whether or not the US rebalance is 
aimed at containing China’s growth. The renewed focus in the region from the US has 
certainly been in part a response to China’s growth, but the US has interests beyond China in 
the region. The “balancing dilemma,” as Thomas Wright calls it blogging for The Diplomat, 
must straddle the line between encirclement of China and preserving the equilibrium of the 
region.45 
Preserving the equilibrium of the region is also an interest of New Zealand. Stable markets 
and law abiding actors are key to New Zealand’s security and economic interests, and the 
US is the most prolific supplier of enforcement with regard to those interests at the moment, 
and for the foreseeable future. With some calling for the Australasian region to ‘look north’ 
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to see the future,46 New Zealand must take an informed and balanced approach to its 
relationships. Small states watching the interplay between the US and China, the converging 
size of their relative economies, and China’s defence build-up can get understandably 
nervous about the prospects for conflict. It remains to be seen if the proposed $1 trillion US 
defence spending cuts over the coming decade will negatively affect the benefits New 
Zealand and the Australasian economy have experienced as a result of the US security 
umbrella. Obama has remained optimistic and said the cuts “will not - I repeat, will not - 
come at the expense of the Asia Pacific."47 
Kenneth Lieberthal describes the Obama administration’s complex strategy in the Asia-
Pacific as one designed to engage China directly to foster more cooperation and to establish 
a strong presence in the region intended to “encourage constructive Chinese behaviors.”48 In 
other words, the US will take an accommodating stance toward China as long as China plays 
by the rules established with heavy Western influence. But categorizing the Obama 
administration’s plans as a ‘complex strategy’, as Lieberthal does, is not all together 
accurate or helpful. The rebalance is robust and comprehensive, but it has historical 
precedent and follows the relatively straight forward examples from previous 
administrations. Engaging China directly and accommodating their needs was the approach 
taken by both US President Richard Nixon in 1972 and US President Bill Clinton in 1998. 
Though the US takes issue with China’s human rights record, both Nixon and Clinton chose 
to maintain the relationship, despite their strong ideological differences. The direct approach 
means “working with China wherever possible, and not linking one issue with another.”49 
Sino-American relations are informed by many factors, including public perception and the 
views of partner and ally nations. One part of the effort to inform the international 
community on the intentions of the US rebalance which has differed from the past examples 
is that this time around there has been a marked increase over predecessor administrations 
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with the number of high level diplomatic visits to the Asia-Pacific.50 Of the last four 
Secretaries of State, during her first three years in office Clinton visited the Asia-Pacific 10 
more times than her nearest predecessor. This diplomatic effort has been essential to help 
deflect some of the criticism and speculation the US receives surrounding its deployment of 
Marines to Northern Australia,51 or the US Navy’s planned stationing of littoral combat 
ships in Singaporean ports.52 
The US’ multi-faceted approach of engaging both allies and less friendly states by means of 
an increased diplomatic presence in conjunction with an increased defence presence nicely 
encapsulates two ends of the spectrum for how the US rebalance is being pursued in the 
Asia-Pacific. Marine deployments and littoral combat ships represent the end of the 
spectrum associated with a strategy designed to contain China, and to deter it from exerting 
too much influence beyond its borders, or at a minimum prepare for such eventualities. On 
the other end of the spectrum is an accommodative diplomatic rhetoric which expresses 
America’s contentment with China’s rise. Neither tells the whole story of the rebalance, but 
taken together both provide a solid indication of what the US’ actual position is – one of 
taking a hedging stance. Hedging in IR is about playing both sides of an issue, planning for a 
worst case scenario of armed conflict while working towards compromise and mutual 
understanding. White said, “Essentially, America has three options. It can resist China’s 
challenge and try to preserve the status quo in Asia. It can step back from its dominant role 
in Asia, leaving China to attempt to establish hegemony. Or it can remain in Asia on a new 
basis, allowing China a larger role but also maintaining a strong presence of its own.”53 
White would have the US withdraw from Asia, compete with China, or share power in the 
region. These options are bold and the extreme end of more nuanced possibilities. The 
softer, more real-world applicable version of White’s assessment is for the US to 
accommodate China’s rise, attempt to contain it, or work with China while hedging against 
their accumulation of an intolerable level of influence. The following sections will discuss 
each option and how the US is approaching its choices as well as how New Zealand is able 
to take advantage of similar strategies. 
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Accommodation 
Officially the US position vis-à-vis China is one of accommodating its rise in economic and 
political influence.54 Panetta told the delegates at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2012, “Some 
view the increased emphasis by the United States on the Asia-Pacific region as some kind of 
challenge to China. I reject that view entirely.”55 When Clinton said, “[A] thriving America 
is good for China and a thriving China is good for America,”56 one could assume the US is 
taking the position that the benefits of accommodating China’s rise outweigh the negatives. 
Strong economies in Asia and the West are beneficial for New Zealand, a country whose 
economy relies on the consumption of raw materials by its trading partners. With the four 
year anniversary of New Zealand’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China having passed 
in 2012 and Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks in full swing,57 the economic motivations 
are strong for New Zealand to remain engaged with both powers. But if TPP talks continue 
as they are structured today some warn China’s absence from the negotiation presents a 
“real potential for a split between a Chinese and US-led regional economic order, which is 
emphatically not in New Zealand interests.”58 New Zealand advocating for an 
accommodating American policy toward Asia benefits the small state because a US policy 
that restricts China’s economy could strangle the flow of goods between New Zealand and 
Asia. 
White has addressed the question of how to handle China’s rise, in particular with relation to 
how the US should handle it, and he advocates for an engaged sharing of power. “Like 
everyone else in Asia, we need to balance carefully the costs and risks of accommodating 
China against the costs and risks of confronting it,” White said, adding, “When the costs of 
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confrontation are clearly understood, accommodation – within clear limits – becomes the 
only credible option.”59 For White, the US must withdraw from Asia, contest China’s 
challenge to American primacy, or share power with China. The withdraw option is all but 
unavailable for US politicians to sell domestically, the contesting option too dangerous, and 
as White put it, the sharing of power option, though the best, is an “inherently very difficult 
thing to do.”60 Though all three of White’s options have undesirable elements, the risks and 
costs of rivalry are much higher than those associated with sharing. 
The main problem with an accommodative strategy for the US is that it is contingent on 
China playing by Western rules. China must rise “in a manner consistent with the status 
quo.”61 If China acts like a revisionist state with intentions of changing the regional political 
landscape, then accommodating politics will yield to containment strategies. 
Containment 
Containment can be understood in its most basic form as a strategy to defend one’s interests, 
as opposed to taking an offensive posture.62 Interests cover the spectrum from freedom from 
fear (presence of security), to territorial claims, to access to a region or resource. How then 
do these conceptions apply to the case of the US rebalance? For the US, it is clear as a state 
with if not hegemonic aspirations then at least a hegemonic memory, and a perception that 
they have something to live up to. As John L. Gaddis puts it, “the fundamental American 
interest was not so much territory, or industrial-military capacity, but credibility: if the 
United States allowed itself to be successfully challenged in any part of the world, then its 
determination to resist aggression would be called into question everywhere else.”63 If then 
the US must defend its credibility around the world, containing China’s challenge to 
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American access to the region through the Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defence 
build-up is an imperative.64 
Containing a small or medium sized regime could be done unilaterally or through 
multilateral sanctions from a handful of western states, but to contain a state the size of 
China which nearly every country relies on in some fashion for trade and economic 
interaction is not only unwise but unfeasible. Containment as a strategy served a purpose 
when it provided guidance for dealing with an adversary motivated by a political ideology 
not supported by the West. But the West today does not face an ideological foe as it did 
during the Cold War. “Without an ideological foe, the practitioners of containment cannot 
persuade states to organize their foreign policies to oppose others. In effect, states lack a 
compelling reason or the political will to coordinate their policies and actions. They view the 
world, not as a dangerous struggle against an expansionist ideology, but as a relatively 
benign contest between democratic and authoritarian states.”65 And while it is not today a 
democratic country, China is not completely an authoritarian regime, though the CCP is 
doing all it can to retain one-party rule. 
Containment has a hint of a strategy from a by-gone era when zero-sum politics ruled the 
day. John Mearsheimer, bastion of realist politics, said, “Australian’s should be worried 
about China’s rise because it is likely to lead to an intense security competition between 
China and the United States, with considerable potential for war.”66 The debate continues as 
to whether the US and China are actually enmeshed in a contemporary realist power game.67 
The Obama administration addressed this question directly when Clinton said “Geopolitics 
today cannot afford to be a zero-sum game.”68 Whether the US can afford it or not, there are 
some in Beijing and around the region who see China’s relationship with the US as a “long-
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term zero-sum game.”69 Even comments from Wellington express scepticism over 
America’s message. “Despite Ms. Clinton's assurances at the forum that the Pacific was ‘big 
enough for all of us’, America's recent re-balancing of military forces in the Asia Pacific has 
been widely read as a containment strategy against China.”70 With Clinton out as head of the 
US State Department it will be up to Senator John Kerry to project the diplomatic voice of 
Washington in 2013. 
One might not blame China for having fears of US containment aspirations. Noting 
Obama’s planned deployment of Marines to Australia in 2012 Kerry told reporters, “You 
know, the Chinese look at that and say, ‘What's the United States doing? They [sic] trying to 
circle us? What's going on?’”71 A consistent party-line message is important for the US, and 
sending mixed messages is confusing. How the US speaks and acts in the Asia-Pacific has 
an impact on how China and other countries perceive American intentions in the region. It 
does little good to talk of “what’s good for China is good for the US” while sending littoral 
combat ships to Singapore and Marines to Australia. 
Beyond the Washington beltway there is disagreement between those who say the US is 
trying to integrate China into the international system of law abiding states and those who 
say the US is trying to manage the Asian giant and control its political and economic 
lifelines. “This is all about China,” Whitesaid when speaking about the rebalance policy.72 
White’s statement flies in the face of the official Washington position which is gearing its 
public posture to deflect rather than inflame Chinese containment fears. 
The accommodation vs. containment debate extends to US participation in the regional 
institutional architecture in the Asia-Pacific. “There is a demand from the region that 
America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions,”73 according to 
Clinton. While involvement with regional institutions is important to American 
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policymakers, these relationships are intended to supplement, but not supplant bilateral 
ties.74 The US is “seeking to shape and participate in a responsive, flexible, and effective 
regional architecture – and ensure it connects to a broader global architecture that not only 
protects international stability and commerce but also advances [US] values.”75 
Generally Asia-Pacific countries are interested in the US being more involved in regional 
organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and EAS, but “questions remain 
about what US participation means for the East Asia Summit or broader regional 
architecture.”76 Though they said it is unlikely, David Capie and Amitav Acharya argue that 
some in Asia “fear Washington will try to force a new EAS agenda focused on geopolitics 
or that it will seek to do away with ASEAN’s central role. Others worry the EAS could 
become a forum dominated by the US–China rivalry.”77 Despite Beijing having embraced 
ASEAN-centred institutions as part of its regional engagement over the past decade, the 
other side of that story is that “China increasingly sees institutions as an irritation and a 
constraint on its power.”78 
But where then does a strategy of containment lead? No one is looking to supplant the CCP 
or to enact regime change in China. Rather, in this instance, containment is trying to effect 
behaviour change, a modification of behaviour “through a combination of deterrents and 
rewards – sticks and carrots.”79 Lieberthal sees one of the functions of the US rebalance as a 
means to bolster a sense in the region that other countries “need not yield to potential 
Chinese regional hegemony.”80 This perspective alludes to a strategy of using smaller states 
in the region to resist the Chinese challenger in a coordinated manner. If popular nationalist 
sentiment among the Chinese masses interprets the American resurgence in the region as a 
threat to China’s growth, Chinese leadership may feel the need to push back, and as 
Lieberthal says, “remind the United States of the changing real balance of power in Asia.”81 
This situation would at least raise the temperature of tensions in the region if not open the 
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door for conflict. But since neither China nor the US want to enter into an intense security 
competition such an occurrence is unlikely. Of the three options available to US and New 
Zealand foreign policy makers presented here, a strategy of containment is the least 
attractive and most costly. 
Hedging 
The third and most attractive option available to not only the US but also small states is a 
hedging strategy. A hedging strategy is one where a state couples accommodating 
approaches with policies designed to draw upon regional and global ties in an effort to 
diminish the impact of another state’s pursuit of conflicting or limiting interests.82 Although 
the manner in which the US engages in a hedging strategy differs from virtually all other 
states in the Asia-Pacific, the concept remains the same. States hedge in order to take 
advantage of the positive benefits of accommodating while securing an ‘insurance policy’ 
against less desirable outcomes.  
Large and small states alike are able to hedge by stressing “engagement and integration 
mechanisms” while simultaneously emphasizing “realist-style balancing in the form of 
external security cooperation.”83 The main difference between a large and small state 
hedging is that while a large state such as the US or China can directly control the security 
aspects of their ‘insurance policy’, small states like New Zealand rely more heavily on the 
support from and cooperation with their larger partners in security matters. With respect to 
‘engagement’, the term should not be used interchangeably or necessarily in conjunction 
with accommodation as some have alluded to.84 A state can engage another state without 
offering up concessions or accommodating the rivals strategic preferences. The cost-benefit 
analysis the US has undertaken regarding China has led them to a hedging strategy, 
prompting them to ramp up engagement in the Asia-Pacific by re-confirming old 
relationships in the region with countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, India, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Australia and even New Zealand. But whether to engage or not is a is 
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only the first question. States must then answer the question of how will that engagement 
take place. 
New Zealand has a role, at least from the US perspective, when it comes to an Asia-Pacific 
engagement and hedging strategy. When asked how important alliances and friendships are 
for US foreign policy interests in Asia, Harvard University IR scholar Stephen M. Walt 
responded by saying, “Alliances will be central to America’s Asia policy. The United States 
is a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but our ability to operate in other theatres — 
including Asia — depends on support from allies. Furthermore, given that our main strategic 
goal in Asia is to maintain a regional balance of power, supporting key allies is an 
inescapable element of our entire approach.”85 Maintaining a regional balance of power will 
require the US to do more than just engage China. While there is still room for China’s 
economy and influence to grow, the US and its key partners in the region are keeping close 
watch on China to ensure the rules, norms, and institutions that have been established 
continue to be observed by China. Outside these parameters the US will begin to tap into its 
‘insurance policies’ around the region. 
When Kerry said, “we need to establish rules of the road that work for everybody,"86 it is not 
clear if everybody can agree on the same rules, or if it is even possible to see such a task to 
fruition. What Chinese officials fear is the US having unrestricted influence. “The U.S. 
approach combines engagement, binding, and balancing mechanisms. U.S. policies aim to 
bind China further into the existing international system of norms, rules, and institutions and 
to shape its evolving interests and values through bilateral and multilateral engagement.”87 
While highly effective thus far, the US strategy is rather transparent and not nearly as benign 
as the official line coming out of Washington would make it appear. Even with a hedging 
strategy that seeks to accommodate and integrate, only turning to direct security measures if 
necessary, this has an implicitly coercive element that aims to deter China from challenging 
the current regional security order. 
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China has benefited greatly from the current norm structure. Yet, by the very nature of its 
rapid growth and insistence on other states not intervening in its policies, China is 
dissatisfied with the international system modelled under total US dominance. China wants 
to limit the ability of other nations to constrain its pursuit of “its general foreign policy goals 
of maximizing its influence, leverage, and freedom of action while pursuing economic 
development to facilitate its re-emergence as a great power.”88 Still, China does not want a 
fight; it can ill afford one in a time when success was very recently measured in annual 
double digit growth figures. 
Why then would a small state like New Zealand want to participate in a US hedging 
strategy, or develop a hedging strategy of its own? New Zealand does not rely so heavily on 
China that it cannot ultimately afford to lose the economic benefits it currently receives 
through that relationship. Losing China as a trading partner would hurt, but it would not 
cripple New Zealand. Like the US, New Zealand has chosen to work with China wherever 
possible and not link issues which would preclude cooperation. New Zealand has more to 
gain by accommodating China and not allowing ideological differences to get in the way of 
doing business. And unlike Australia, which does not have the advantage of a large 
continental land mass between it and the whole of Asia, New Zealand does not experience 
nearly as much stress regarding questions of security. Nevertheless, all small states must 
find partners to secure their defence interests, and thus far New Zealand has relied on the 
help and friendship of Western powers, like its close Australian ally and American friend, 
for such security arrangements. 
Harland saw both the US and Chinese involvement in regional politics as essential. 
Moreover, he saw New Zealand as having a role to play in keeping the peace and 
contributing to policies of accommodation over containment. His thoughts on containment 
and New Zealand’s role in the Asia-Pacific are no less relevant today than they were more 
than a decade ago when he wrote: 
The New Zealand government is interested in expanding the markets for its exports and 
attracting more investment. It is also interested in promoting human rights, and 
discouraging their abuse. But New Zealand’s main interest must always be peace – or, as it 
used to be called, security. Conflict anywhere in the Asia-Pacific region is likely to affect 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 153. 
26 
 
New Zealand, even if it does not involve it directly. That fundamental interest is best served 
at present by encouraging regional co-operation, and resisting any move to split the region 
into blocs by going back to the failed policy of Containment. New Zealand is well qualified 
to do that. It is a small country: no one need be afraid of it. And its actions in the past 
demonstrate that, while it is friendly with the United States, as well as with China, it does 
not always follow either country, or any one else. Only perhaps in this country itself is there 
any serious doubt that New Zealand is an independent country, dedicated above all to the 
cause of peace. And, in the Pacific, peace depends on good relations between America and 
China.
89
 
Harland’s sentiment reflects that, as a small state, it is in New Zealand’s best interest to seek 
profitable arrangements and peaceful interactions between large states in the region. This is 
not a far cry from the US perspective where “[t]he imperative for Washington is to define its 
strategy not in terms of containing problems, but of restraining forces that contribute to 
instability, chaos, and war.”90 This approach has much less to do with China or China’s rise 
and much more to do with a recognition of a shift in the geopolitical and economic center of 
gravity in the world, something all nations can take note of. Hedging against conflict and 
accommodating growth and development at the same time is a strategy all states can 
implement without unacceptable risk to economies or security. 
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New Zealand’s position 
Though it stole headlines for several months, the landscape of IR did not change drastically 
after the US announcement of their intended rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Foreign policy 
makers in Australasia had seen the writing on the wall and were subdued in their reaction to 
the refocused energies of the Americans. In this respect, New Zealand and Australia have 
been in the same camp when it comes to the US rebalance – one of a measured response, 
embracing the rhetoric, but maintaining a healthy scepticism about US intentions and 
capabilities. Both New Zealand and Australia took what might be categorized as a prudent, 
albeit benign approach to the US ‘pivot’. 
Though similar in many respects, Australia and New Zealand find themselves approaching 
the balance of power between China and the US in the Asia-Pacific from inherently different 
perspectives. Where Australia’s choice is clearer as an official ally of the US,91 the picture is 
open to more interpretation on the other side of the Tasman Sea, where maintaining strong 
traditional alliances or transitioning to an Asian or China-centric foreign policy are only two 
of the myriad options available. 
New Zealand’s balancing act 
The US has experienced the closest thing to hegemony, as defined by a state’s ability to act 
unrestrained beyond its own borders, in the past century. New Zealand’s warm, then cool, 
and now warming relationship with the US has at times limited its options with regard to 
access to the political and military influence of the Western giant. Yet the options available 
for small states in a liberal tradition of Western hegemony since the end of WWII go well 
beyond simply choosing sides and riding coat tails. New Zealand in particular, today even 
more so than in the period between the end of WWII and their break from the US portion of 
the three-way Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty in 1985, has options 
available that policy makers must balance. 
New Zealand is a small and geographically isolated country on the fringe of the Asia-Pacific 
region.92 Relative isolation and a close connection with the West has spawned unique 
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characteristics in the island nation among states in the region, starting with its strong 
relationship with its neighbour to the northwest. New Zealand’s closest partner and ally in 
Australia has long informed and sometimes defined New Zealand’s foreign policy. But since 
the mid-1980s New Zealand has taken intentional and determined steps to establish 
differentiation from its heritage-based relationship with Australia and Britain. New Zealand 
does not follow a strict association with its Western political heritage, and it differs from the 
US value structure of individual freedom and liberty above all else by placing more 
importance on principles of social justice and fairness.93 
The challenge that New Zealand and every small to medium sized power faces is how to 
engage multiple value structures from a Western-based system to an Asian model. Both 
New Zealand and China’s nearer neighbours in Asia “face the need to strike a complex and 
shifting balance between conflicting imperatives. Certainly none of them wants to live under 
China’s thumb, but equally none of them wants to make China an enemy. Above all, they 
want peace, stability and opportunities to grow.”94 The clear advantage for New Zealand to 
partner closely with the US is to increase security ties with the country that boasts the 
greatest power projection capabilities in the world. The reasons for New Zealand to draw 
closer to China are equally apparent and revolve around the economic opportunities attained 
through tapping into the demands of over one billion consumers. The question for New 
Zealand is can it court both partners simultaneously while maintaining a focus on its own 
interests and not sacrificing too much ground on questions of values. 
Despite holding a different set of values as paramount, New Zealand and China have both 
existed and prospered within the post-WWII liberal international tradition, one founded on a 
rules-based international order with a tacit association with US hegemony codified at the 
end of the Cold War.95 Attempts to talk about a ‘clash of civilizations’, an ‘Asian Way’, or a 
China Model for growth and development, though popular to debate, have not gained much 
traction in IR literature.96 Yet China does offer an alternate model of values, if not 
civilization, that guide state action based on social cohesion, consensus building, and non-
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intervention. The landscape today is one of a more diffuse platform of traditional, economic, 
and intellectual power increasingly spread through East and South Asia.97 
The benefits to New Zealand’s economy of a close relationship with China are increasingly 
evident. China moved past Australia in 2011 as New Zealand’s largest source of imports and 
was second to Australia as a destination for exports.98 The impetus for these developments 
spring forth in large part from the FTA New Zealand and China were able to secure in 
2008.99 The benefits of the FTA are one part access to Chinese policy makers and one part 
exposure to Chinese markets. A concerted push by Prime Minister John Key’s 
administration to prepare New Zealand for success in a Chinese driven Asian world-
economy is evident. Initiatives like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT) NZ Inc. China 
Strategy100 were designed with the intention of educating New Zealand business people on 
how to enter Chinese markets, which often come with different sets of expectations and 
ways of doing business centred on deference and hierarchy. The Key government likely 
realizes that New Zealand “is certainly already in a situation where any major disruption to 
its economic links with China would create a need for major and painful adjustments.”101 
Does an intentional tilt toward China mean, as has been feared by Europe over the US 
‘pivot’, that New Zealand is tilting away from its more predictable partners? Has New 
Zealand undergone a ‘pivot’ of its own? Chris Elder and Robert Ayson caution that New 
Zealand’s relationship with China may not be as ‘special’ as some think.102 China has many 
suitors and engages myriad countries economically and diplomatically on a daily basis. New 
Zealand can lay claim to their ‘four firsts’, of which the free trade agreement is one, but 
“these examples of successful small power diplomacy are not in themselves enough to place 
the relationship on a stable, long-term footing.”103 
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A tilt away from traditional partners has not been part of New Zealand’s strategy thus far. 
The American rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has a strong East Asian component, but it has 
included investment of time and resources in New Zealand. While it is reasonable to assume 
that the US’ comprehensive re-engagement of the Asia-Pacific owes more to its wish to 
balance China’s influence than it does a desire to strengthen its ties to New Zealand, there 
has been a renewed and noticeable level of defence cooperation between the former ANZUS 
allies. 
When New Zealand and the US came to loggerheads over New Zealand’s anti-nuclear 
stance almost 30 years ago the two broke off direct defence relations. The chill between the 
two nations was both a reflection of New Zealand’s willingness to act independently on the 
international stage and served as a national rallying cry. The Austral-American relationship 
remained intact and grew in strength after the New Zealand split,104 and the ANZUS 
breakdown initially prompted friction between Australia and New Zealand over the extra 
work required to keep New Zealand informed now that the US was no longer engaging New 
Zealand as directly. Despite the initial friction, trans-Tasman cooperation increased in 
subsequent years, cementing Australia as New Zealand’s closest security partner.105 
The American rebalance to New Zealand’s region has encouraged the small state to not tilt 
too far toward China. This is especially evident over the past decade which has seen a 
warming trend between the US and New Zealand. New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Murray McCully has said of the American relationship, “Today our friendship continues to 
grow. It is a friendship based on a common set of interests and a common set of values.”106 
Whether the US and New Zealand have a precisely shared set of common interests and 
values is debatable, but they are close in relative terms. In 2002 US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell commented that “we are very, very, very good friends,” and six years later his 
                                                 
104 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Australian Government, “Strong And Secure: A Strategy for 
Australia’s National Security” (Commonwealth of Australia 2013, January 23, 2013), 22, 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/national-security-strategy.cfm. 
105 Robert Ayson, “When Cooperation Trumps Convergence: Emerging Trends in Australia-New Zealand 
Defence Relations,” Security Challenges 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 31. 
106 Murray McCully, “A Warming Relationship,” New Zealand International Review 37, no. 4 (August 2012): 
6. 
31 
 
successor Condoleezza Rice went a step further, stating during a visit that New Zealand was 
both “a friend and an ally.”107 
Though not technically allies, and with little to no chance of New Zealand backtracking on 
its anti-nuclear stance on the horizon, the New Zealand/US relationship has never the less 
taken distinct and practical turns in that direction. With the signing of the Wellington 
Declaration in 2010 the two countries committed themselves to cooperate on climate 
change, renewable energy initiatives, disaster recovery, nuclear proliferation, trade, security, 
and sustainable economic development across the region.108 This initiative focuses 
specifically on areas near New Zealand shores, and has been seen by some to signal that the 
thaw between the US and New Zealand is complete.109 
If the thaw was not fully complete in 2010, then the signing of the Washington Declaration 
in 2012 surly served to melt what ice remained between the global super power and the 
South Pacific player. Upon the signing of the Washington Declaration New Zealand’s tilt 
toward Asia was arrested, if not reversed, in a move that to some resembled a security 
alliance. The Washington Declaration made New Zealand “a de facto ally of the United 
States.”110 Though no official alliance between the US and New Zealand exists or is likely to 
in the near future, increased talks, visits, and collaboration on issues in the Pacific provide 
“a framework for cooperation to focus, strengthen and expand the bilateral defense 
relationship.”111 Moreover, New Zealand continues to enjoy, as doe Australia, a major non-
NATO ally status with the US.112 
The Washington Declaration uses language that leads to talk of a ‘de facto’ alliance when it 
states that the US and New Zealand intend to; ensure the participants’ capabilities are able to 
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counter traditional and non-traditional threats to their security interests; cooperate in the 
development of the participants’ deployable capabilities, in support of peace and security in 
the Asia-Pacific; and affirm that the participants are prepared to respond in accordance with 
national approval processes to contingencies which may arise in the region, including 
multilateral cooperation with regional partners’ armed forces.113 As Ayson pointed out, this 
language is “not too far from Anzus [sic],”114 in that it covers contingencies beyond New 
Zealand’s immediate neighbourhood. “[W]e don't just mean the Pacific. The canvas is the 
wider Asia-Pacific region. That means New Zealand is more likely to be seen as a 
participant in American's rebalancing in Asia.”115 This falls in line with the US interest “to 
strengthen its key alliances, to build partnerships and to develop innovative ways … to 
sustain U.S. presence elsewhere in the world.”116 
Is it then a Western-world dominated by the near hegemony of the US, or a Chinese 
influenced Asian inspired economic boom time model that New Zealand finds itself 
balancing between? The short answer is both. As a small isolated country New Zealand must 
engage multiple value structures. It oversimplifies the point to say that small states are at the 
mercy of large ones. The liberal tradition of IR and politics that arose with the coming of 
age of America’s global reach brought with it a system that provides for a country like New 
Zealand to engage, if not influence, where it sees fit. New Zealand will not in the 
foreseeable future be choosing sides between the US and China, though it may be accused of 
riding one or both sets coat tails at different times. It is most likely that New Zealand will 
take advantage of China’s economic influence by dealing directly with the Asian trading 
partner while simultaneously keeping close security ties with the US. This model for New 
Zealand will resemble something of a ‘two sides of the same coin’ strategy. The coin 
represents New Zealand’s interests with China on one side and the US the other. New 
Zealand will benefit most from engaging both partners on different sets of issues but with 
the same focus on New Zealand’s value structure and particular set of interests. In other 
words, this is New Zealand’s hedging strategy. 
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If the US is able to maintain its rebalance efforts in the Asia-Pacific its interests will 
inevitably collide with those of China. Likewise, New Zealand will face increasingly 
frequent opportunities to take a position relative to these intersecting interests as the US and 
China bump into one another. China and New Zealand both have interests in the Pacific as 
well, and the opportunity exists that “China’s involvement may cut across New Zealand’s 
objectives.”117 One area where this has already occurred is with New Zealand and 
Australia’s efforts to support a return to democracy in Fiji which has been “rendered less 
effective by China’s political engagement and economic support for the [existing military] 
regime.”118 China’s tendency to work with whatever regime is in power means its ‘no strings 
attached’ aid programs could be working against New Zealand interests.119 There is also 
concern that China’s soft loans to the region will cause issues in the future when those loans 
are called in. It behoves New Zealand to stay abreast of China’s initiatives in the South 
Pacific as it is “arguably the only part of the world where New Zealand’s perspectives may 
carry more insight than China’s.”120 
It is by no means clear that China is trying to usurp Australia or New Zealand’s influence in 
Fiji,121 but China’s growth in ability to influence brings with it inherent opportunity to 
change the equilibrium of the region. New Zealand’s long standing interest and participation 
in Asia-Pacific affairs make it a unique and insightful partner for either the US or China. 
Indeed Clinton has said, “We also believe on the aid front that there is a lot of cooperation 
between us and China. It is something that we're modelling after New Zealand.”122 This 
speaks to the notion that while “New Zealand may not be able to influence the big external 
quantum shifts,”123 it can offer region-specific experience and freedom of movement 
between the major powers in the region. 
In order to maintain that freedom of movement between the powers New Zealand must be 
able to accomplish the difficult task of continuing to engage both, but not at the expense of 
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either. Engaging both is different than maximizing both relationships. The former simply 
means to continue to keep open avenues of dialogue, while the latter is impossible as China 
and the US have at times conflicting interests which New Zealand cannot simultaneously 
maximize. What New Zealand can do is act as a good international citizen by cooperation 
with the US in the Pacific on a broad range of regionally important issues per the Wellington 
Declaration without appearing to choose sides. But signing on to agreements that hint at 
security alliances is much less palatable for Chinese policy makers. Therefore, “An informal 
and incomplete alliance relationship with the US is much more compatible with good 
relations in Asia with a rising China.”124 
From the American perspective, renewing and keeping close ties to New Zealand is 
advantageous. It therefore made sense that Panetta was the first US Secretary of Defense to 
pay New Zealand a visit in 30 years. Even more so than their staunch Australian supporter, 
New Zealand can be for the US something of an access point to the Asia-Pacific. The 
Americans see New Zealand as having an ‘in’ with China with “plenty of contacts but not 
too much baggage in the South Pacific, and a good reputation for supporting 
multilateralism.”125 For the US, or any other country, “there is no such thing as having too 
many close partners when you are worried about China.”126 Though some caution that 
America’s return to New Zealand is a feeling out process to learn exactly “when and where 
Wellington sees itself…as a strategic player,” Rob Lyon said warning the US of New 
Zealand’s intentions adding “the return of strategic cooperation seems likely to be on a case 
by case basis.”127 
Partners in the status quo 
New Zealand has been a staunch supporter of China’s international integration in the form 
of their well-known ‘four firsts’. The China FTA is the most recent of the ‘four firsts’, and 
the others include being the first Western country to conclude a bilateral agreement with 
China to speed its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), being the first 
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developed economy to recognize China’s status as a market economy, and being the first 
developed country to enter into Free Trade Agreement negotiations with China.128 These 
efforts on New Zealand’s part are not insignificant or uncalculated. Helping China into the 
WTO is to the benefit of small states like New Zealand. “China’s cause has become the 
cause of trade liberalisation. Its importance to New Zealand can scarcely be exaggerated.”129 
China’s rise is the result of marketization of their economy, a concerted effort by Chinese 
leadership at lifting tens of millions of Chinese citizens out of poverty by, and the 
institutionalisation of China internationally. Though China does not conform to every 
international norm lauded by the West, it has been moving ever closer. 
The Western-dominated international system post-WWII has intentionally aimed to integrate 
every nation-state, both small and large. This integration has been to the benefit of the West, 
and in particular to the US as the originator of many of the norms and organizations that fill 
the IR landscape. China has also been a major beneficiary of the system that has been in 
place for the latter half of the twentieth century, and continues into the twenty first century. 
In many respects it is good for the US that China has grown as a marketplace for American 
products, and even as a source of investment in a struggling US economy. It is good for New 
Zealand that China has prospered under the Western international order as a destination for 
export goods like milk, wood, and wine. And it is good for China to be a member of the 
international community that supports international law and freedom of trade between states 
that uphold the values and norms of international economics. 
China, the US, and New Zealand are all partners in the status quo of maintaining the system 
they all benefit from. In this case, as it goes for Australia so it goes for New Zealand when 
White said, “Ideally, of course, we would want the status quo. Uncontested American 
primacy has been remarkably good for Australia, and if it could be sustained that would 
clearly be our best option.”130 Small, medium, and large states alike benefit from their 
membership and their active participation in both the mechanisms of international 
economies and the acceptance of shared values and norms. 
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The interests that New Zealand shares with its larger partners contribute to a shared interest 
in maintaining the existing relatively peaceful world order. If Harland’s earlier statement 
that “New Zealand’s main interest must always be peace” is indicative of New Zealand’s 
position, then Richard Haass’ writing in the journal Foreign Affairs takes on added 
significance and further supports the notion that small and large states alike seek to be 
partners in the status quo in the name of their shared interest in peace: 
“[a] further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other 
major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and 
political stability. They do not, accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their 
national interests. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods, services, 
people, energy, investment, and technology-flows in which the United States plays a critical 
role. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict.”
131 
In other words, the better China does as a member of the global economy that has spurred on 
its seemingly unstoppable growth the more dependant it is on those networks and 
relationships. This dependency China experiences with regard to the system it is a part of 
speaks to the necessity and urgency with which the CCP seeks to maintain growth at all 
costs. “The legitimacy of China’s political leadership is increasingly dependent on economic 
development, which while it has been spectacular, remains surprisingly brittle.”132 
New Zealand has been at the fore front of establishing independent relations with China 
since the early 1970s when China began opening up again to the West. But the question still 
needs to be asked to what extent a small state has influence over a large one. There is a 
sense that a “systemic logic” has developed which has “gathered a force that will enmesh 
and entrap even the most powerful.”133 Is New Zealand then a convenient partner of China 
and the US or an essential one? Do New Zealand’s interests play into the considerations of 
its larger friends, or is New Zealand bobbing along on the waves of a more powerful 
‘systemic logic’? Are there options available to New Zealand that go beyond choosing sides 
or playing to both a sympathetic Western ear and an Asian sentiment? As White put it, “We 
want the strongest possible economic relationship with China and the strongest possible 
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strategic relationship with the United States.”134 But are these options mutually exclusive 
and are Australia’s options different than New Zealand’s? 
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New Zealand’s options 
The options available to New Zealand as a small state operating in a theatre where two large 
and powerful states are vying for influence are as open and varied as New Zealanders are 
willing to risk. The spectrum of options is reducible down to choosing to side with either the 
US on one end or China on the opposite end. A centre position would be one where relations 
with both the US and China are maintained as best as possible. While the ends of the 
spectrum are options available to New Zealand, and are options that other states, e.g. 
Australia, have engaged in some measure, they are not desirable as a means of advancing 
New Zealand interests at present. 
New Zealand has sought to establish an independent set of foreign policies, though often 
informed by its close relationships with Britain, Australia and the US. With the emergence 
in the past several decades of China as a major partner for New Zealand economically the 
considerations for cooperation and partnership have expanded to include the Asian giant. 
Though important today, China was not the first Asian economy New Zealand has engaged; 
Japan was a major emerging trade partner after WWII.135 New Zealand’s fervent attachment 
to internationalism, organisational participation and representation, and a pursuit of identity 
and independence will continue to direct foreign policy decisions in the coming decades. 
Though economic interests play heavily into decisions of today this is the result of peace 
time prosperity and not what constitutes the core of New Zealand’s foreign policy identity. 
The balance of power in the Asia-Pacific continues to shift toward China irrespective of 
American attentions. “The shift in power is being driven by China’s rise, not by America’s 
decline. There is not much America can do about it.”136 Nor does it appear the US wishes to 
completely stop the trend if it is to be believed that Washington is operating under the edict 
that what is good for China is good for the US. That same edict applies to New Zealand, and 
very likely the greater Asia-Pacific region. A more engaged and integrated China will have 
spill-over benefits for economies that not only tolerate but support China’s growth. 
In order to take advantage of China’s rising economy and influence New Zealand requires 
nimble diplomacy. “This requires those framing New Zealand’s external policy, and the 
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community more generally, to accept that the patterns of association, and the value systems, 
that have underpinned our foreign policy decision-making throughout the post-war period 
are no longer to be relied upon to the same extent. The process will from now on become a 
great deal more complex, the trade-offs less easily arrived at.”137 Elder and Ayson frame the 
situation as one that will require New Zealand to “face a series of smaller judgement calls,” 
as opposed making a definitive choice between major powers.138 
This option will require New Zealand to be politically and economically agile, and will 
demand a significant investment in the regional institutional order, both in terms of funding 
and rhetorical backing. While New Zealand does not have game changing capacity in the 
region it “does have a voice in determining the shape and the scope of regional 
institutions.”139 Harland’s contemporarily relevant options for New Zealand include the 
small state remembering it is “not at the centre of the universe” and “[w]hat happens in the 
rest of the world affects [New Zealand] much more than [New Zealand’s] actions affect it.” 
In order for New Zealand to look after its own interests it must closely follow developments 
in the rest of the world, and must be able to articulate its case “in terms of other countries’ 
interests” in addition to its own. New Zealand must also work with the countries which have 
the “power to get things done,” and be able to develop long-term relationships and not get 
distracted by short-term considerations that may jeopardise those relationships, “no matter 
how pressing they are.” In order for New Zealand to exert any influence on other countries – 
“to attract their interest, and win their support when it matters to [New Zealand]” – New 
Zealand must be able to stand on its own feet and “be able to offer others something they 
want.” With a nod to the last traditional partner in New Zealand foreign relations Harland 
added that New Zealand must continue to foster and even grow economic and political ties 
to Australia (something he admitted then was “not at the top of the political agenda” and it 
remains so today). Finally, New Zealand must strengthen its position globally by working 
more closely with other partners in the region, including ASEAN states. Harland is 
prophetic when he says “Pacific regionalism is not yet as powerful a movement as its 
counterparts in Europe and the Americas, but it is growing, as are the countries that are 
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taking part.”140 With the ARF and Pacific Island Forum (PIF) bringing large and small 
nations to the table and TPP trade talks moving forward, the Pacific and the greater Asia-
Pacific as a region is only growing in importance. 
Small states and internationalism 
Under the Howard government Australia saw international institutions as largely unrelated 
to the construction of Australia’s state identity or pursuit of national interest, but New 
Zealand under the Clark government saw its state identity as intimately tied up with a 
principled commitment to the international rule of law and multilateralism. Though the Key 
government has taken steps to bring New Zealand’s foreign policy more in line with its 
economic policy, since the 1950s through today New Zealand is “far more consistent in its 
commitment to a rules-based world order than Australia.”141 
Small states like New Zealand “have long been attracted by the idea that world peace and 
prosperity can be achieved through international co-operation.”142 But it was not until after 
the US entered World War I in 1917 and US President Woodrow Wilson “propounded the 
doctrine of self-determination” that small-state League of Nations members began to have 
an interest in upholding the League Covenant providing a guarantee against aggression.143 
The League of Nations, and later the United Nations, provided the platform upon which 
small states’ voices could be heard. 
Small states have been accused of, due to constraints on resources, “low participation” in 
world affairs.144 John Henderson said these constraints on resources narrow a small state’s 
scope and leaves them to focus attention on economic issues. “In an effort to compensate for 
their limited resources,” Henderson said, “small states seek to conduct much of their foreign 
                                                 
140 Harland laid out these points in a lecture he gave at the University of London in 1991 about New Zealand’s 
options as a small state amid this emerging power structure, and to an extent they hold true twenty years on. 
Harland concerned himself with the US, Germany, and Japan. While the US is still a major player, Germany 
and Japan have taken a back seat to China. Harland’s ‘Emerging Tripolar World’ might now be better 
categorized as a bi-polar world consisting of the US and China with heavy regional influence from the likes of 
South East Asia, India, Europe, Russia, and Brazil leading the South American contingent. Bryce Harland, 
Small Countries in a Tripolar World, The Fourth Menzies Lecture (London: Sir Robert Menzies Centre for 
Australian Studies, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1991), 14–16. 
141 Richard Devetak and Jacqui True, “Diplomatic Divergence in the Antipodes: Globalisation, Foreign Policy 
and State Identity in Australia and New Zealand,” Australian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 2 (2006): 
254–255, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361140600672451. 
142 Harland, On Our Own, 65. 
143 Ibid., 65–66. 
144 Beyond New Zealand: The Foreign Policy of a Small State (Auckland, N.Z: Methuen, 1980), 3. 
41 
 
policy within the framework of international organisations, agreements or alliances.”145 New 
Zealand’s current ambitious and persistent bid for a non-permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council in 2015-2016 is one example of how a small state can conduct part 
of its foreign policy in front of a larger audience.146 A continued presence at the table at 
APEC, EAS, ARF, and the PIF, as well as hosting several rounds of talks on the TPP add to 
the argument that New Zealand seeks to foster its interests via international co-operation. 
Though former New Zealand diplomat Terrence O’Brien argued “that moment has not 
arrived” which New Zealand would push for institutional change in the form of an Asia-
Pacific Community, “New Zealand, along with Australia, possesses obvious interest, 
nonetheless, in ensuring that regionalism in whatever form remains ‘open’.”147 
Inherent in New Zealand’s UN Security Council seat bid is a desire to be heard and a 
platform on which to pursue interests. The UN might seem like the perfect place for a small 
state to express its concerns, but as with much of the Western-based international order, that 
may only work as long as those interests are in line with those of the most powerful states. 
Participation in the UN is more than a tacit acceptance of the value and values of the 
organisation; it is an explicit agreement with them. But does the UN truly have the best 
interests of small states at heart? Harland describes the UN as “the centre-piece of a system 
that had been set up by the US in accordance with its own principles.”148 The question must 
then be asked is New Zealand simply attaching itself to a strong friend in the US through the 
UN, and if it is will those efforts be rewarded? 
Harland went on to say: 
Powerful states could be influenced by international pressure, but they could not be coerced 
without war. This was the reason for the Veto given to the permanent members of the 
Security Council. It might be unfair, arguably undemocratic, but it reflected the reality of 
international politics. Small countries like New Zealand could gain little by girding against 
it. They could achieve more, in the UN as well as in the world at large, by working with one 
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or more of the great powers – those countries that have the power to get things done, or to 
stop them happening.
149
 
New Zealand’s search for an “alternative to the historic ties with Britain” was unsuccessful 
through to the last decade of the twentieth century.150 The US is the only country to have 
emerged from the twentieth century with the kind of political, economic, and military sway 
that Harland would have seen as categorizing it as a ‘great power’. In that regard, New 
Zealand seeking a seat at the table of the Security Council makes sense for a small state 
trying to advance its interests by teaming with those who have both the power to ‘get things 
done’ or to ‘stop them happening’. 
Identity and independence 
Putting the ‘nation’ in nation-state has from its origins as a colonizing settler society been at 
the root of New Zealanders defining their place in the world, in the Asia-Pacific, and 
especially in relation to their neighbours across the Tasman Sea. New Zealanders perceived 
independence is part of their identity, and that identity informs New Zealand foreign 
policy.151 “[F]or many, independence has become the touch-stone of our foreign policy.”152 
But is New Zealand really ‘on its own’ as Harland said?153 The past three decades of New 
Zealand foreign policy and international relations has seen its own rebalance that pre-dates 
and even foreshadows the American move. As a small state, New Zealand has been able to 
move more quickly and respond with greater ease to the changes it saw. It has done so in a 
fashion unique to New Zealand which has helped forge the nation that lives within the state. 
New Zealand’s defence relationships with Australia, Britain, and the US sheds light on 
aspects of New Zealand identity which have been shaped by involvement in conflicts from 
the Boer war in South Africa, the World Wars, and conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and now 
Afghanistan. It was not until New Zealand’s participation in the Vietnam conflict that their 
long standing antipodean defence relationship with Britain was first tested.154 Fighting in 
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Vietnam without British support marked the first time New Zealand experimented with 
living under the American security umbrella.155 This move was in some respects an act of 
transferring dependence to the US from Britain, not simply an act of independence from the 
Britain.156 
New Zealand’s relative independence changed little as a result of working with the US in 
Vietnam, but in the context of fluid and changing identity the move from Britain as the 
traditional security partner to a new Western friend and ally in the US had a dramatic effect. 
After Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973157 and the signing 
of Closer Economic Relations with Australia in 1983,158 New Zealand found it was no 
longer tethered to either the security or economy of Britain. 
The mid-80s, however, put New Zealander’s sense of collective self to the test when popular 
outcry in upport of New Zealand’s firm anti-nuclear stance put it at odds with the US, and 
the two countries subsequently broke with their link in the ANZUS alliance. “[New 
Zealanders] have always prided themselves on their independence of mind, adaptability and 
self-reliance. The anti-nuclear dispute has enhanced their pride, and the self-respect that 
flows from it.”159 Touted as a moral victory, New Zealand was catapulted into the spotlight 
as the David to America’s Goliath. “Indeed, the non-nuclear issue in New Zealand illustrates 
the power of a norm embedded in national culture to shape state identity through foreign 
policy regardless of the geopolitical and political (and potentially economic) costs associated 
with it.”160 Those economic costs never materialised,161 and only recently have the political 
costs associated with New Zealand moulding its own identity in opposition to its American 
ally seemed less troublesome. 
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If the 1980s and New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance were the crucible by which modern New 
Zealand was formed, then the 1990s was the decade of the hammer that shaped the New 
Zealand of today. The economic, trade, and immigration relationships and policies that came 
out of the 1990s have been every bit as important to creating the New Zealand identity that 
informs policy makers in the twenty first century. These two influential decades placed New 
Zealand in a competitive, rather than dependant relationship with its traditional European 
and British origins,162 and encouraged New Zealanders to re-evaluate their place in the 
world; no longer just a smaller version of Britain in the Pacific, but more and more a part of 
Asia. 
Once Britain turned to the EEC New Zealand ceased acting as Britain’s source of affordable 
agricultural goods. Up to that point an essential piece of the New Zealand identity was as 
provider for the dominion, putting meat and dairy products on English dinner tables. As a 
part of the British imperial system from the late eighteenth century through the middle of the 
twentieth century New Zealand was connected to and drew much of its identity from the 
cultural, economic and political ties it kept with the United Kingdom (UK).163 James Belich, 
in his tome on New Zealand’s history said, “In 1960, most Pakeha [non-Maori] New 
Zealanders had little doubt who they were. They were Better Britons: a distinctive Kiwi 
branch of the British tree, a species of the genus Briton whose superiority to the original was 
demonstrated in war, sport and the climbing of mountains. By 2000, an identity crisis had 
developed among Pakeha.”164 The small island nation was forced to look beyond its 
traditional partners for new economic relationships. 
This “crisis of national identity”165 contributed to New Zealand’s fluid sense of identity, and 
stemmed from New Zealanders facing an uncertain world where traditional linkages with 
the West were under review. At the same time Britain was joining the EEC New Zealand 
was finding the US a receptive defence partner in Southeast Asia. Despite the delegitimizing 
effects the Vietnam War had on US aspirations in the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand had 
effectively begun its late-twentieth century balancing act; not between the UK and Asia, but 
between the US and Asia. 
                                                 
162 Capie, “New Zealand and the World: Imperial, International and Global Relations,” 596. 
163 Ibid., 574. 
164 Belich, Making Peoples, 465. 
165 Paul Spoonley and Augie Fleras, “New Zealand Immigration: National Identity, Social Cohesion, and 
‘Race’ Relations,” in Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150. 
45 
 
Whether it is ‘birth’, ‘blood’, or ‘belonging’ that determine ones identity, New Zealanders 
are faced with a sense of ‘ontological unease’ surrounding who they are as a nation.166 
Belich calls the ever aging attachments to Britain ‘residues’ of a colonial collective 
identity.167 New Zealanders have a European connection, Pacific connection, and an 
increasingly Asian connection. This Asian, and in many cases Chinese, connection is 
changing the demographic make-up of New Zealand raising questions for New Zealanders 
about who they are and where they belong. “Pakeha are from Europe, from Britain, but we 
no longer belong there. We are in the South Pacific, in Maori land, but we are not yet quite 
at home here.”168 While it would be inaccurate to say that New Zealand foreign policy is 
fickle, it is fair to reiterate the fluid nature of New Zealand’s international interactions. 
Asian economic growth after the “failure of the communist economic model and the 
liberation of global capital” brought on changes within New Zealand society, “and in its 
international economic and political ties.”169 The first change within New Zealand was 
expressed with the enacting of the 1987 Immigration Bill which had the expressed purpose 
of enriching the multi-cultural fabric of New Zealand through targeting migrants based on 
their potential contribution to the country, and facilitating the entry of visitors to foster 
tourism, trade and commerce, cultural, educational and scientific activities.170 Four years 
later an immigration points system was introduced in an effort to increase the effectiveness 
of the original immigration bill which set both a new tone and standard for immigration 
geared toward economic prosperity over ethnic or heritage based policies.171 The shift from 
country of origin factors to an immigrant’s ability to contribute to New Zealand society was 
a deliberate attempt to fill a labour gap and grow New Zealand’s international exposure. The 
shift in immigration policy led to changes in immigration flows and started trends of 
immigration growth, specifically from East Asia and India. 
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The impact of Asian immigration on New Zealander identity, and therefore New Zealand’s 
foreign policy, coincides with the rapid growth of Asian economies over the past quarter 
century. If the first goal of immigration reform was to enrich the multi-cultural fabric of 
New Zealand “[t]here was a parallel development in reclassifying New Zealand as an Asia-
Pacific nation as a matter of national economic interest.”172 In the mid-80s and early-90s 
successive New Zealand governments deployed a campaign of rhetoric to make New 
Zealand become a ‘part of Asia’, resting the country’s economic hopes in the twenty-first 
century on these links to the region.173 When Prime Minister Jim Bolger made the comment 
in May of 1993 that he was ‘proud to be an Asian leader’ he sparked a debate over whether 
New Zealand was abandoning its traditional sense of cultural and ethnic identity for a 
national identity focused on economic growth.174 To be sure, then as now, the foreign policy 
of New Zealand has been in favour of international economic engagement unencumbered by 
differences in ideology. As Prime Minister Key said, “For the first time in New Zealand’s 
history, the engine of world economic activity has shifted to our geographic region, the 
Asia-Pacific,”175 and he has shown a willingness to link New Zealand’s economic security 
in some measure to China’s growth despite domestic rumblings of anti-Chinese sentiment. 
The decade following immigration reform in New Zealand came with new relationships at 
home and abroad. Trade with Asian countries rose to more than a third of exports through 
agreements like the one signed with China. Institutionally there was also “enthusiastic” 
support for regional groups like APEC as a matter of recognizing the importance of Asia-
Pacific focused economic interests.176 These economic interests were being driven from 
within, and domestic leaders were responding to more than just regional economic changes. 
“Along with commercial interests, the country’s changing demography was driving a new 
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interest in East Asia.”177 But folding that Asia-interest into New Zealand’s collective 
consciousness proved a difficult task to navigate: 
But if Asia had suddenly become somewhere to embrace, not keep at a distance, political 
relations were not always smooth sailing. Concerns over human rights abuses complicated 
ties with Indonesia and China. Energetic protest groups sprang up to demand independence 
for East Timor. For some, closer ties with Asia also raised challenges of identity. Asian 
migrants in New Zealand were the target of racist populist political attacks. Elites accepted 
Asia’s importance, but much of the public did not feel part of the region and many Asian 
governments still regarded Australia and New Zealand as ‘European’ outsiders.
178 
Though divisions over ideology remain, New Zealand governments have chosen to take a 
practical approach to dealing with Asian economies. Disagreements over questions of 
human rights violations did not prevent New Zealand from signing a trade agreement with 
China. But how much did identity play into the Chinese trade partnership? Would the China-
New Zealand FTA have been possible before immigration reform in the 80s and 90s? 
Though certainly not the whole story, immigration reform likely greased the wheels of 
diplomacy for those trade talks. What impact if any did the post-immigration reform 
Chinese diaspora in New Zealand have on China’s domestic sentiment toward New 
Zealand? Probably very little, but the reverse may not be so easily ignored. Asian 
immigrants, and in many cases educated and capital flush Chinese who were directly 
targeted by the immigration points system helped facilitate and lubricate interactions 
between New Zealand and China.179 
So then did New Zealand’s identity change allowing it to engage Asia, or was New 
Zealand’s identity changed as a result of engagement and accommodating policies in Asia? 
The end of the twentieth century for New Zealand relations with Asia was not a ‘chicken or 
the egg’ situation, rather a both/and scenario. New Zealand made the decision to focus its 
attention on its own region because it was partially abandoned by Britain, and because it saw 
opportunity in shifting economic relationships. This decision required further action to take 
full advantage. New Zealand was able to better integrate with those Asian relationships by 
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changing its immigration policies and relaxing the manner in which it engaged countries like 
China - something New Zealand was not required to do in order to take advantage of its first 
major foray into Asian economic engagement. The 1950s saw Japan emerge as an eager 
participant in the global economy. But unlike China’s economic ascension, Japan faced “the 
continuous and unrelenting task of manoeuvring in a bureaucratic and business system in 
which it enjoyed no advantages of sentiment, knowledge or leverage. It was an outsider, and 
an impotent one at that.”180 Few would argue that China’s rise has been without leverage 
and certainly not impotent. 
Here one must be careful not to afford New Zealand’s China-policies too much import in 
influencing China’s rise. New Zealand has certainly paved its own path to China and has 
reaped the rewards of the effort, but as it was with Japan so too is it today with China that 
“New Zealand was not crucial to the process from the economic point of view but it did 
have some political significance, as a Commonwealth member and ally of the United States. 
It was important for Japan to normalise its relations with such countries, to break down the 
reservoir of suspicion.”181 In this light one can see that both China and New Zealand have 
used each other, just for different reasons. New Zealand saw great opportunity in the Asian 
economies of Japan after WWII and China after the Cold War. Both Japan and China may 
have seen New Zealand as an unthreatening Western partner with connections to countries 
of greater strategic interest. While New Zealand did not make Japan’s reconstruction or 
China’s rise possible all on its own, the small state may be something of a unique test-bed 
for modern day Chinese experiments in higher levels of partnership with the West. 
Both changing economic realities and notions of identity contributed to, and continue to 
contribute to, an era in New Zealand foreign policy, and indeed small state foreign policy, 
where governments must react quickly to changes in power distribution. New Zealand and 
the Key government have taken big steps toward China, and in doing so risk inviting a 
challenge to New Zealand’s national identity as payment for greater integration into the 
Asia-Pacific economy. This scenario “seems likely to make Asia only more important to 
[New Zealand] in the future, but it remains to be seen if that influence will come at the 
expense of New Zealand’s ‘Western’ or ‘British’ character. Harland cautioned, “If 
independence is cherished, it is an asset to be used sparingly, when it is really needed, and 
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can produce real benefits.”182 New Zealand must decide if the benefit of risking a shift in 
their national identity is tolerable. The opposite is likely not seen as risky a scenario as 
closer relations with the US would fall in step with that portion of New Zealand’s identity 
that already has an innate ‘Western’ or ‘British’ character. Perhaps a more likely scenario is 
that New Zealand’s international and global relations will come to reflect what one scholar 
has called “‘hybridisation’, with fluid local, regional and transnational identities competing 
to shape national interests and polices in the decades ahead.”183 
What is not in question for the coming few decades is where New Zealand sees both its 
economic and security futures originating. For New Zealand, and most small states, the two 
futures are married; and a tenuous marriage it is. Little will change in the coming two 
decades for small states who look to the US for security and China for economic 
opportunity. Increasing immigration numbers from China and the rest of Asia coming to 
New Zealand will not be enough to turn New Zealand away from its cooperation with the 
US over security issues, e.g. were a crisis event to occur in the South China Sea between the 
US and China, New Zealand is aligned with American interests to maintain a relative peace 
and order in the region despite China’s territorial claims and increased naval presence in the 
region. But greater integration with China and Asia will have the cumulative effect of 
encouraging New Zealand to take a more balanced approach to its relationship with the 
West. New Zealand has even begun taking soft steps toward appeasing their larger Asian 
trading partners by not endorsing, tacitly or otherwise, politically sensitive issues with 
Indonesia surrounding West Papuan independence,184 or culturally sensitive issues with 
China and Falun Gong.185 New Zealand’s experience with Japan from the 1950s through the 
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1980s has informed their current foreign policy, which today as then has “accepted that its 
economic future would lie, not with one partner, but with many.”186 
Foreign policy decisions are driven by security concerns, economic adjustments, and notions 
of national identity. While immigration policy may act as a mirror to these themes, in New 
Zealand’s case, following changes in strategic association with traditional Western powers 
and dramatic shifts in global economics, immigration policy changes from two decades ago 
can now be seen both as a sharper reflection of identity and a harbinger of things to come. 
New Zealand’s identity will remain for the next several decades a moving target amid the 
US rebalance and New Zealand’s increasing interconnectedness with Asia. It is unclear 
exactly how independent New Zealand is with its foreign policy today, and it may require a 
test of resolve to see if the security umbrella from the West or the economic umbrella from 
the East takes precedence. 
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Conclusion 
There are unanswered questions that loom over the current political melange New Zealand 
finds itself in as a small state on the periphery of two major powers. The first question 
concerns the US’ staying power in the Asia-Pacific. It is unclear if the US possesses the 
resources and energy to sustain its rebalance. With a domestic financial sector still reeling 
after a near-depression and proposals on the table to cut the defence budget by hundreds of 
billions of dollars over the next decade,187 Americans may lose their taste for international 
engagement at the level to which its Asia-Pacific partners have grown accustomed in favour 
of getting their own house in order. The future of the US rebalance is far from assured. 
The unanswered questions on the other side of the Pacific are even more pressing. How long 
will China continue to grow? Can China sustain double digit economic growth, and if so at 
what cost to China and its neighbours? If not, there are costs for the CCP domestically as 
their legitimacy stems directly from continued growth. The Chinese development model is 
producing “extreme disparities in wealth, pervasive problems in product and food safety, 
increasing corruption, catastrophic environmental degradation, decreasing returns to 
investment, widespread feeling that the system itself has become unfair, and so forth.”188 As 
much as New Zealand’s economic future is to the north, China’s future depends on its 
ability to solve these issues. 
New Zealand’s relationship with Australia has fewer ambiguities but is still relevant to how 
New Zealand relates to China and the US. Australia looks and talks like a US-in-the-South 
Pacific by proxy, but it walks more like New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand both 
hedge against China’s expanding geopolitical rejuvenation of sovereignty189 through 
increasingly closer ties to US defence, while happily accommodating China’s ravenous 
demand for natural resources and low value-added goods. The difference between the two is 
that Australia has effectively chosen its side as a staunch US ally, whereas New Zealand 
policy makers have chosen to view decisions made today in the context of a changing Asia-
Pacific order. As much as New Zealand’s close relationship with Australia is an asset as a 
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gateway to continued economic and security ties, when it comes to China the connection 
could someday prove to be a liability. It is likely the trans-Tasman relationship between 
Australia and New Zealand will never reach a stage where the two will have identical 
interests or perceptions of threat, and therefore they will continue to make their own 
decisions regarding foreign policy. 
If the best option for New Zealand, or Australia in their more biased manner, is to hedge and 
continue with an East and West balancing act, the next question is for how long is such a 
strategy viable. Is there a time limit on hedging? Is maintaining equilibrium in the Asia-
Pacific too lofty a goal for a state the size of New Zealand, or even for one as big as 
Australia? “Whether we can continue to rely at the same time on America for our security 
and on China for our prosperity depends not on us, but on both of them,” according to 
White. “If either country decides that we have to choose between them, then we do.”190 
Perhaps hedging is merely a means to get by until major powers work out how or if they will 
cooperate. While hedging may be the best option for New Zealand today, it may not be in 
the future. 
It is how New Zealand manages the small decisions in the coming decades that will 
determine how well the country navigates the waters of a regional power shift and the 
American rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.191 In the current climate of China’s continued 
economic growth and America’s reengagement in the Asia-Pacific, “New Zealand … does 
not want to have to choose between America and China: if it did, it could only lose.”192 The 
closer New Zealand gets to the US the more it appears to be adopting a containment 
strategy, which will diminish the return on investment in China. The closer New Zealand 
gets to China the more susceptible it will be to the reality that in China, domestic issues 
always come first. New Zealand cannot afford to have a solely transactional relationship 
with China lest it come to depend so heavily on the large trading partner as to be subject to 
its whims.193 Though this eventuality is improbable, it is clear that in the years to come 
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China will have the capacity to exercise a significant level of economic influence over New 
Zealand, and China “will not feel constrained from bringing that influence to bear.”194 
The best course for New Zealand to chart in the coming decades is the measured moderation 
of a hedging strategy. Despite ever present security concerns and economic pressures in the 
Asia-Pacific, politics are relatively smooth and predictable today. This situation affords New 
Zealand the luxury of being an independent small state, capable of forming relationships on 
its own. Less predictable times in the past have meant for New Zealand that it was caught in 
the wake of the bigger players’ moves. Predicting the future is a hazardous occupation, but 
New Zealand policy makers would be wise to continue their balancing act as long as they 
can. Not only can New Zealand not captain the ships that are the US rebalance and China’s 
rise, but it should not, and does not want to. Far better to maintain amicable relations on 
both sides of the Pacific while continuing to put its energy into the places that New Zealand 
can influence. Regional institutions, support for international law, open and transparent 
markets; these are the tools of a small state in the 21st century. As long as the liberal 
international order persists, New Zealand will have a voice. 
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